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 Abstract 
Definitions of emotion and emotional phenomena are often infused with intuitions and 
theoretical ideas about what is “truly” emotional. Although these intuitions and ideas 
motivate people to study emotion, their prominence at the conceptual level can hamper 
progress in emotion research. In this paper, we argue that there is merit in defining emotional 
phenomena as much as possible in terms of behavioral principles that have been developed 
outside of emotion research. We clarify that such a functional approach is compatible with, 
and can even strengthen, cognitive approaches to emotion research. This functional-cognitive 
perspective reveals ways to increase the cumulative nature of emotion research and to surpass 
initial intuitions and theoretical ideas. 
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Toward a Cumulative Science of Emotion: 
A Functional-Cognitive Framework for Emotion Research 
The concept of emotion is at the same time the biggest asset and the biggest liability 
of emotion research. It is an asset because most people have an intuitive sense of what an 
emotion is, that emotion is important, and that they lack insight into this important 
phenomenon. Hence, there is widespread interest in and support for emotion research. The 
concept of emotion is, however, also the main liability of emotion research. It is a pre-
scientific term that stems from everyday language and lacks a precise definition that is 
generally agreed upon. Because different people have different intuitions about what a “real” 
emotion is, there is no consensus about what it is that needs to be explained in emotion 
research (i.e., explanandum).  
This lack of consensus resulted in unproductive and persistent debates about the 
definition of emotion and emotional phenomena (Russell, 2003). Although there definitely is 
merit in having debates about definitions, such debates tend to be fruitless when definitions 
are infused by subjective (e.g., an intuitive understanding of what emotion is) and theoretical 
ideas (e.g., pet theories about what processes underlies emotions; Wittgenstein, 1958).  
Moreover, emotion research is destined for failure if its success depends on how readily the 
results it produces fit with our initial, intuitive understanding of emotion. Just like the 
scientific analysis of the physical universe has led to insights that differ in important ways 
from, and even surpass, intuitive understandings of the universe, so too should we be willing 
to accept that the scientific analysis of emotion may lead to conceptualizations of emotion 
that differ from, and even surpass, people’s initial intuitive understanding of this concept. The 
prerequisite that emotion research should explain “true” emotion as it is intuitively 
understood, constrains emotion research in ways that are scientifically counterproductive. 
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 In this paper, we outline a functional-cognitive framework for emotion research that 
allows for functional definitions of emotional phenomena, that is, definitions in terms of 
well-established behavioral principles rather than pre-scientific intuitions and layman terms. 
These behavioral principles (e.g., operant conditioning, stimulus control, motivating 
operations) have been developed outside of the realm of emotion research and refer solely to 
the way in which environment and behavior interact (see Catania, 2013, for a review). Within 
the functional-cognitive framework, pre-scientific intuitions about what is truly emotional 
can be used to guide which behavioral phenomena are considered worthy of study within 
emotion research but the behavioral phenomena themselves are described without reference 
to these intuitions. Functional definitions of emotional phenomena are also void of mental 
concepts that feature in cognitive explanations of emotional phenomena (e.g., semantic 
networks, appraisals). Unlike the strictly functional approaches advocated by radical 
behaviorists such as Skinner (1953), the functional-cognitive framework that we put forward 
(De Houwer, 2011; De Houwer, Hughes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2017a; Hughes, De Houwer, & 
Perugini, 2016) highlights that functional definitions of emotional phenomena are perfectly 
compatible with, and can even strengthen, cognitive approaches to emotion.  
In the remainder of this paper, we first explore ways in which emotional phenomena 
can be defined in terms of behavioral principles. Next, we briefly explain why these 
functional definitions are compatible with and can strengthen the cognitive approach to 
emotion research. Finally, we discuss possible limitations and implications of the functional-
cognitive framework for emotion research.  
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The Functional Approach to the Study of Emotion 
 Within the confines of this paper, we can only hint at ways in which emotional 
phenomena can be linked to behavioral principles. We therefore encourage our readers to 
consult other papers that discuss these issues in much more detail (e.g., Friman, Hayes, & 
Wilson, 1998; Lewon & Hayes, 2014). With this caveat in mind, we would like to briefly 
discuss a functional perspective on five phenomena: emotional behavior, emotional 
dispositions, emotional situations, emotional learning, and conscious emotional states.  
Like other types of behavior, emotional behavior can be characterized on the basis of 
the antecedents and/or consequences that control it. Respondent behavior is behavior that is 
solely under the control of its antecedents, that is, those elements in the environment that 
precede it. For instance, it has been documented that behavior which might be labelled as 
anger or aggression (e.g., biting) can be elicited by painful stimulation (Ulrich & Azrin, 
1962). Most instances of emotional behavior, however, seem to qualify as instances of 
operant behavior, that is, behavior under the control of the consequences it had in the past 
(Moors, 2017). The concept of “operant behavior” implies only functional causation (i.e., the 
consequences of current behavior will influence the probability of subsequent behavior) 
much like evolution theory implies only functional causation (e.g., the current consequences 
of a trait will affect the frequency of that trait in subsequent generations). It has merit 
regardless of whether there is agreement about the (mental) mechanism via which past 
consequences influence current behavior (e.g., the anticipation of future consequences) just 
like the merits of evolution theory do not hinge upon agreement about the (genetic) 
mechanisms underlying evolution (see Chiesa, 1992; Skinner, 1953). Note that operant 
behavior also depends on antecedents such as discriminative stimuli that signal when a 
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behavior was followed by certain consequences in the past. Emotional behavior that appears 
to depend primarily on antecedents (e.g., showing pride, sadness, happiness, surprise) could 
thus still be operant in that it is also a function of the consequences it had in the past (e.g., 
support or admiration from others).   
The statement that an (emotional) behavior qualifies as an operant simply implies that 
a manipulation of (a) the consequences or (b) the impact of the behavior on those 
consequences should influence the behavior (also see Layng, 2017). It has been argued that 
emotional behavior can be grouped in different classes according to the type of outcomes that 
control the behavior (Skinner, 1953, Chapter 10). For instance, behaving in an angry or 
aggressive manner can be said to differ from other (emotional) behavior in that it depends on 
damage being inflicted on persons or objects (Skinner, 1953, p. 163; see Layng, 2017, for an 
alternative functional perspective). 1 
It is important to realize that by defining emotional behavior as a class of responses 
that are under the control of specific consequences, the classification of emotional behavior 
goes beyond the superficial (topographical) features of individual responses. For instance, it 
captures the fact that aggressive behavior is not restricted to responses that inflict physical 
damage to others (e.g., hitting others) but can include also the absence of responding (e.g., 
not interacting with others because this adversely affected others in the past). In other words, 
conceptualizing emotional behavior as operant behavior captures the fact that physically 
                                                          
1 As noted by a reviewer, certain aggressive acts appear to be emotionless but still driven by the same 
consequences as “truly” emotional behavior (e.g., an army general who orders the destruction of a city in an 
emotionless manner). One could, however, question whether those seemingly non-emotional aggressive acts are 
indeed a function of the extent to which they inflicted harm on others (e.g., the order of the army general might 
be related to winning wars, not to the harm that is inflicted upon the inhabitants of the city, as would be 
evidenced by the fact that the general would still order the destruction of the city if the inhabitants would not be 
harmed, provided that similar acts facilitated victory in the past). Moreover, the example of emotionless 
aggression illustrates how intuitions about what “real” emotions are (e.g., they must accompanied by “hot” 
feelings) can put a priori constraints on scientific thinking in emotion research. 
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different behaviors (e.g., biting, kicking, verbal criticisms, avoiding others) are all members 
of the same class of responses in that they are controlled by the similar consequences (e.g., 
getting rid of, or avoiding, a disliked person; Catania, 2013). Identifying the consequences 
that determine emotional behavior not only increases understanding of those behaviors but 
also allows one to influence them, for instance, by changing (the appeal of) those 
consequences.  
Emotional dispositions can be described in terms of the probability of emotional 
behavior (Skinner, 1953). For instance, we often label people as being fearful when there is a 
high probability that they will show fearful responses. Likewise, emotional situations are 
situations that increase the probability of emotional behavior. What is important here is that 
the increase in probability occurs across many situations (in the case of emotional 
dispositions) or across many individuals (in the case of emotional situations). This of course 
does not explain why certain people are fearful or why certain situations evoke fearful 
responses but it offers a description of these emotional phenomena that does not make a 
priori assumptions about the mental causes of those phenomena (e.g., inner causes such as 
schemata in memory or psychodynamic conflict). Moreover, describing emotional behaviors 
in terms of emotional dispositions or situations implies a hypothesis about the functional 
causes of those behaviors. It singles out factors related to the person (e.g., the learning history 
of that person) or to the situation that are crucial in bringing about specific emotional 
behaviors, thus highlighting ways to influence those behaviors (e.g., offering new learning 
experiences or changing the situation).   
The notion of emotional dispositions clarifies that a functional approach to emotional 
behavior not only takes into account the events that are present in the current environment but 
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also those that were present in the past. It thus provides an intrinsically historical perspective 
that stimulates researchers to clarify how emotional dispositions arose during the history of 
the organism. In examining the learning history that underlies emotional behavior, 
researchers can draw upon the vast knowledgebase that has been generated as the result of the 
functional analysis of behavior in general, such as research on classical and operant 
conditioning (see Catania, 2013, for a review).  
Unlike to what is often assumed, also internal states such as conscious feelings can be 
included in a functional analysis of emotion. For instance, when a feeling is considered as 
(covert) behavior, it can be examined what the antecedents and consequences are of those 
feelings (Skinner, 1953; see Layng, 2017, for an alternative). Moreover, events leading to 
internal emotional states have been conceptualized as motivating operations, that is, as events 
that determine the reinforcing value of certain outcomes (see Lewon & Hayes, 2014, for an in 
depth discussion). For instance, the antecedents of subjective feelings of anger (e.g., painful 
stimulation) increase the extent to which damage to others functions as a reinforcer, much 
like the antecedents of hunger (e.g., food deprivation) increase the extent to which eating 
functions as a reinforcer (see Michael, 2004, pp. 141-143). In fact, motivating operations are 
thought to play a central role in many aspects of emotion (Lewon & Hayes, 2014). As 
Skinner (1953, p. 165) already noted, “the fields of motivation and emotion are very close. 
They may, indeed, overlap”. 
The Cognitive Approach to the Study of Emotion and Its Relation to the Functional 
Approach 
 Many researchers are not satisfied with describing emotional phenomena in terms of 
environment and behavior relations; they want to know the mechanisms underlying those 
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phenomena. Cognitive psychology offers a mechanistic approach to the study of emotion in 
which the mediating mechanisms are composed of informational units that operate on each 
other to produce behavior, much like cogwheels in a mechanical clock operate on each other 
to produce the movement of dials (Bechtel, 2008). Other mechanistic approaches are also 
possible (e.g., a neurological approach) but the latter focus on mechanisms that involve other 
parts and operations (e.g., chains of electrical and chemical activity in neurons).  
Multiple ideas have been put forward about the nature of the mental mechanisms that 
underlie emotion, such as the appraisal of situations in terms of goals. It is clearly beyond the 
scope of the present paper to review all of these theories (see Moors, 2017, for an insightful 
analysis of cognitive emotion theories). The main point we want to make here is that - from a 
functional-cognitive perspective - those theories are perfectly compatible with the sorts of 
functional analyses of emotional phenomena outlined in the previous section. The framework 
highlights that the functional and cognitive approaches in psychology are located at two 
different levels of explanation that have different things they aim to explain (explanandum), 
and that use different concepts in order to achieve explanation (explanans). Whereas 
functional psychology aims to understand behavior (explanandum) in terms of the 
environment (explanans), cognitive psychology wants to understand the impact of 
environment on behavior (explanandum) in terms of mental processes (explanans; De 
Houwer, 2011; Hughes et al., 2016). For instance, whereas the claim that an emotional 
behavior is an operant behavior explains the behavior by highlighting the past consequences 
it is a function of, appraisal theories explain the impact of those past consequences on current 
behavior by describing the goals and appraisals that have been shaped by those past 
consequences and that produce the current behavior.  
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Because the two approaches have different aims, they are not competitors. In fact, 
elements of one approach can be used to help achieve the aims of the other. Most important 
within the present context, a definition of emotional phenomena in purely functional terms 
(e.g., in terms of motivating operations) helps researchers to remove from those descriptions 
concepts that are tied into specific cognitive theories (e.g., semantic networks, appraisals). 
This can improve communication between proponents of different theories because they can 
now share a way of describing the phenomena that they study without having to use concepts 
that are tied into their own theoretical perspective. Moreover, using the framework 
maximizes theoretical freedom in that it allows researchers to consider novel theoretical ideas 
without having to change the definition of to-be-explained phenomena. In that way, the 
functional-cognitive framework increases the cumulative nature of emotion research because 
knowledge about emotional phenomena is unaffected by changes in cognitive theories about 
those phenomena.  
Possible Limitations and Implications 
As noted above, some readers might doubt whether it is possible to capture the full 
complexity of emotion in terms of abstract behavioral principles. They might point out that 
functional researchers such as Skinner (1953) already tried and failed, and that there is thus 
no point in trying again. This argument presupposes that Skinner’s approach was the only 
possible functional approach, or perhaps the best one, and that knowledge about behavioral 
principles has remained the same since Skinner’s attempt to study emotion functionally over 
sixty years ago. Even a course inspection of the recent literature will show that a lot has 
changed in functional psychology over the past decades. For instance, new functional 
analyses of language have been proposed that differ substantially from Skinner’s (1957) ideas 
            Functional-Cognitive Framework 11 
about language (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001; see Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2016 
for a general introduction; also see Barnes-Holmes & Hughes, 2013, and Friman et al., 1998, 
for a discussion of the implications for emotion research). Hence, one should not 
underestimate the power of the functional approach. Moreover, it would be beneficial even if 
only some (aspects of) emotional phenomena could be described in functional terms (see 
Moors, 2017, for an analysis that draws heavily on functional terms but still combines this 
with cognitive concepts). In contrast to Skinner’s approach, the functional-cognitive 
framework also acknowledges that the functional approach will never satisfy the aims of 
cognitive researchers. The realization that both approaches have fundamentally different aims 
removes the need for competition and hence maximizes opportunities for mutually beneficial 
collaboration. 
 This message is important also for functional researchers. As noted by Lewon and 
Hayes (2014, p.814), “failure to develop a behavior analytic account of emotions 
unnecessarily limits the scope of a science of behavior and precludes the discovery of 
important functional relations not currently being addressed. A comprehensive science of 
behavior must ultimately account for all sorts of human activity”. The functional-cognitive 
framework reveals that in studying emotions, functional researchers can benefit from the vast 
literature on emotions that has been produced by cognitive researchers. 
This does not mean that it will be easy to foster interactions between the two 
approaches. Cognitive researchers will have to learn the language of functional psychology, 
that is, to analyze behavior in terms of behavioral principles. Functional researchers need to 
respect the aims of cognitive psychology rather than simply dismiss them based on their own 
aims (as, for instance, Skinner, 1990, did) and allow themselves to explore the rich cognitive 
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literature while remaining true to their own aims. Bridging the historic divide between both 
approaches will, however, provide benefits for psychology as a whole, including emotion 
research. 2 
Conclusion 
 We started this paper by noting that the concept of emotion is both the biggest asset 
and the biggest liability of emotion research. The functional-cognitive framework for emotion 
research that we outlined in this paper allows researchers to maintain the motivating and 
orienting function of intuitions about emotion while reducing the risks inherent to an intuitive 
or theoretical conceptualization of emotion. Describing emotional phenomena as much as 
possible in terms of behavioral principles will result in a more cumulative science of emotion 
that has the potential to surpass our initial intuitions and theoretical ideas.  
                                                          
2 A reviewer wondered whether interactions between cognition and emotion (e.g., the impact of emotional 
states on working memory) would fall outside of the scope of a functional approach to emotion. They do not 
because, from a functional perspective, cognition-emotion interactions are in fact behavior-behavior interactions 
(e.g., the impact of emotional behavior on the ability to selectively respond to stimuli).  
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